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ABSTRACT
This paper provides new evidence on the role of preference-based versus statistical discrimination
in racial profiling using a unique data set that includes the race of both the driver and the officer. We
first generalize the model presented in Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) and show that the
fundamental insight that allows them to distinguish between statistical discrimination and
preference-based discrimination depends on the specialized shapes of the best response functions
in their model. Thus, the test that they employ is not robust to a range of alternative modeling
assumptions. However, we also show that if statistical discrimination alone explains differences in
the rate at which the vehicles of drivers of different races are searched, then search decisions should
be independent of officer race. We then test this prediction using data from the Boston Police
Department. Consistent with preference-based discrimination, our baseline results demonstrate that
officers are more likely to conduct a search if the race of the officer differs from the race of the
driver. We then investigate and rule out two alternative explanations for our findings: race-based
informational asymmetries between officers and the assignment of officers to neighborhoods.
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To date, there have been over 200 court cases involving allegations of racial and ethnic
proﬁling against law enforcement agencies in the United States. Typically, the focus in these
cases has been on uncovering why law enforcement oﬃcials treat individuals from diﬀerent
racial groups diﬀerently. On the one hand, the courts have tended to uphold racially biased
policing patterns when they can be reasonably justiﬁed by racial diﬀerences in crime rates.
On the other hand, the courts have consistently ruled against what appear to be purely racist
policing practices. The problem, of course, is that it is not easy to empirically distinguish
between these two possibilities.
Economists, who have long struggled with explaining racial disparities in labor market
outcomes, have now joined the debate over racial proﬁling, and a number of recent papers have
attempted to determine whether the observed racial disparities in policing patterns are best
explained by models of statistical discrimination or models of preference-based discrimination
(see, for example, Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001), Hern´ andez-Murillo and Knowles (2003),
Anwar and Fang (2004) and Dharmapala and Ross (2004)).
In models of statistical discrimination, discrimination arises because law enforcement oﬃ-
cials are uncertain about whether a suspect has committed a particular crime. Thus, if there
are racial diﬀerences in the propensity to commit that crime, then the police may rationally
treat individuals from diﬀerent racial groups diﬀerently. On the other hand, in models of
preference-based discrimination, discrimination arises because the police have discriminatory
preferences against members of a particular group and act as if there is some non-monetary
beneﬁt associated with arresting or detaining members of that group. Thus, preference-based
discrimination refers to anything that raises the beneﬁt (or, equivalently, lowers the cost) of
searching motorists from one group relative to those from some other group.1
This debate among economists over the sources of racial disparities in policing patterns
roughly parallels the debate over racial proﬁling within the court system. That is, statistical
discrimination approximately corresponds to the type of behavior that the courts have tended
to uphold, while preference-based discrimination approximately corresponds to the type of
behavior that the courts have tended to condemn. For this reason, economic theory and
economic analysis may lead to insights that are useful in litigating these hotly-contested
court cases.
1For a complete discussion of models of statistical discrimination and preference-based discrimination see
Arrow (1973) and Becker (1954), repsectively.
2In this paper, we attempt to understand the reasons for observed racial diﬀerences in the
rate at which the vehicles of African-American, Hispanic and white motorists are searched
during traﬃc stops. In doing so, we contribute to the literature on racial proﬁling in a
number of ways. First, we clarify the model of police search developed in Knowles, Persico
and Todd (2001) (hereafter, often, KPT) and show that the fundamental insight that allows
them to distinguish between statistical discrimination and preference-based discrimination is
not robust to a range of alternative modelling assumptions.
According to their model, in the absence of preference-based discrimination, the probabil-
ity of guilt conditional on search will be the same for all identiﬁable groups of motorists. The
logic is that, since the police will always search motorists for whom the likelihood of ﬁnding
drugs exceeds the cost of search, in equilibrium, the drug traﬃcking behavior of motorists
must adjust to equate the probability of guilt conditional on search for all individuals. The
power of this insight is that, even if black and white motorists diﬀer along dimensions other
than race, the probability of guilt conditional on search will still be the same for all groups.
This is critical since it is generally impossible to distinguish between statistical discrimina-
tion on the basis of race and statistical discrimination on the basis of characteristics that are
correlated with race but that are unobserved to the econometrician (see for example, Altonji
and Pierret (2001) and Dharmapala and Ross (2004)).
On the other hand, according to the model in KPT, if oﬃcers have discriminatory prefer-
ences, then the probability of guilt conditional on search will diﬀer across racial groups. KPT
then examine traﬃc stop data from the State of Maryland. They ﬁnd that the probability
of guilt conditional on search does not diﬀer (in a statistical sense) across racial groups and
interpret this as evidence that oﬃcers do not have discriminatory preferences.
As we show below, however, the logic of the test that KPT employ hinges upon the
specialized shapes of the best response functions in the mixed strategy equilibrium of their
model. As a result, their model’s predictions are sensitive to a range of alternative modelling
assumptions. For example, in this paper, we focus on the possibility that oﬃcers are hetero-
geneous in their preferences for search. Indeed, our data (which we discuss below) supports
the notion that, all else equal, oﬃcers diﬀer in their tendency to search motorists. In the
presence of this type of heterogeneity, even in the absence of preference-based discrimina-
tion, the probability of guilt conditional on search need not be the same across all identiﬁable
groups of motorists. Thus, if there are racial diﬀerences in the propensity to carry drugs,
then guilt rates conditional on search also may diﬀer by race.
In KPT, equilibrium diﬀerences in the probability of guilt conditional on search cannot
3persist because oﬃcers always search motorists if the likelihood of ﬁnding drugs exceeds
the cost of search. However, with oﬃcer heterogeneity, oﬃcers with very high search cost
are unlikely to ever search motorists. Since there is some chance that motorists will not
be searched, equilibrium diﬀerences in the probability of guilt conditional on search across
diﬀerent racial groups can exist, even in the absence of preference-based discrimination.
Anwar and Fang (2004) and Bjerk (2004) highlight another reason why probability of
guilt conditional in search may diﬀer across groups even in the absence of preference-based
discrimination. In particular, suppose the police observe some characteristic that is not
perfectly known to the motorist at the time he or she makes the decision to carry drugs, but
that is correlated with the likelihood that the motorist carries drugs. For example, motorists
who traﬃc drugs may know that they are more likely to appear nervous if they carry drugs
than if they do not, but they may not be able to perfectly predict how nervous they will
appear. In this setting, the police will use motorists’ behavior to update their prior beliefs
about the likelihood that motorists from diﬀerent racial groups traﬃc drugs. Further, racial
diﬀerences in the propensity to carry drugs will lead to diﬀerences in the probability of guilt
conditional on search. Bjerk (2004) and Dharmapala and Ross (2004) also point out that if
the police cannot observe all potential criminals, then guilt rates conditional on search also
may vary by race.2 Below, we relate these critiques to our own.
In order to circumvent these problems, we develop an alternative mechanism for testing
between these two forms of discrimination. In particular, we show that if statistical discrim-
ination alone explains diﬀerences in the rate at which African-American and white drivers
are pulled over, then search decisions should be independent of the race of the police oﬃcer.
We then test this prediction using a unique data set in which we are able to match the
race of the oﬃcer to the race of the driver for every traﬃc stop made by oﬃcers in the Boston
Police Department for the two-year period starting in April 2001.3 Thus, in addition to being
able to discern diﬀerences in the likelihood that motorists from diﬀerent racial groups are
subject to search, we are also able to determine whether these patterns diﬀer depending on
the race of the oﬃcer. Previous studies of racial proﬁling have lacked the oﬃcer-level data
required for this type of analysis.4
We ﬁnd that, even after controlling for a broad set of covariates including the location of
the stop, if the race of the oﬃcer diﬀers from the race of the driver, then the oﬃcer is more
2Dharmapala and Ross (2004) also discuss the implications of allowing heterogeneity in the severity of
drug oﬀenses.
3For an alternative discussion of these data, see the series of articles by Bill Dedman and Francie Latour
(2003).
4One exception is Anwar and Fang (2004), which is discussed below.
4likely to conduct a search. These results cannot be explained by standard models of statistical
discrimination and are consistent with preference-based discrimination. We then investigate
two alternative explanations for these empirical ﬁndings. First, we examine whether these
patterns could arise because of diﬀerences in the ability of African-American and white police
oﬃcers to accurately assess the guilt of motorists from diﬀerent racial groups. However, we
ﬁnd that our results hold even among oﬃcers with greater than 10 years of experience,
amongst whom informational asymmetries should be less severe. Finally, we investigate (and
rule out) the possibility that our ﬁndings could be explained by the way in which oﬃcers are
assigned to various neighborhoods within the city.
Some Initial Trends in the Data
In order to motivate our model and the analysis that follows, it is worthwhile to ﬁrst highlight
a few patterns in our data. For now, these patterns are merely meant to be suggestive, and
we will discuss the data in greater detail below.
Table 1 presents, by oﬃcer race and motorist race, the probability that a motorist’s car
is searched during a traﬃc stop. Looking at the last column, we see that both Hispanics and
blacks are almost twice as likely as are whites to have their cars searched. This diﬀerential
search pattern could be the result of preference-based discrimination. However, it is also
consistent with statistical discrimination. That is, if blacks and Hispanics are more likely to
carry drugs or other contraband than are whites, then it is also possible that they are also
more likely than whites to raise the suspicion of the police. Thus, the last column of Table
1 simply reiterates the well-known fact that racial disparities in search rates exist, but does
not oﬀer any insight into why those disparities might arise.
Columns 2-4, however, are more revealing; motorists are, in general, more likely to be
searched if the oﬃcer making the stop is from a diﬀerent racial group from that of the
motorist. For example, the probability that a white motorist is searched is .41 percent if the
oﬃcer is white and .67 percent if the oﬃcer is black. Similarly, the probability that a black
motorist is searched is .81 percent if the oﬃcer is black but 1.0 percent if the oﬃcer is white.
In order to insure that the patterns in Table 1 are not driven by a small number of oﬃcers
who issue an unusually large number of tickets, Table 2 weights each citation by the inverse
of the number of citations given by the oﬃcer issuing the citation. Since oﬃcers who issue
a large number of tickets are less likely to conduct searches than oﬃcers who issue a small
number of tickets, the search probabilities are generally larger in Table 2 than in Table 1.
However, as in Table 1, we see that motorists are consistently less likely to be searched if the
5oﬃcer making the stop is a member of the motorist’s own racial group.
Abstracting at this stage from issues of statistical signiﬁcance and other possible concerns,
we merely wish to point out that the patterns in Tables 1 and 2 are inconsistent with standard
models of statistical discrimination in which racial diﬀerences in the rate at which motorists
are searched arise because the police believe that motorists from some racial groups are more
likely to have contraband than are motorists from other groups. Since these beliefs must
be correct in equilibrium, there should be no diﬀerence in the rate at which oﬃcers from
diﬀerent racial groups search the vehicles of motorists from a particular racial group. On
the other hand, preference-based discrimination could explain these patterns. In particular,
if oﬃcers favor members of their own racial group, then we would expect search rates to be
lower when there is a match between the race of the oﬃcer and the race of the motorist.
However, two alternative explanations also come to mind. First, there may be racial
diﬀerences in the ability of oﬃcers to accurately discern the likelihood that motorists from
diﬀerent racial groups are guilty. For example, it is natural to think that oﬃcers may be
better able to assess the guilt of motorists who are members of their own racial group. A
second explanation for the diﬀerential search rates in Tables 1 and 2 involves the mechanism
through which oﬃcers are assigned to various neighborhoods within the city. For example, if
white oﬃcers are assigned to neighborhoods in which crimes are more likely to be committed
by blacks than whites, and if black oﬃcers are assigned to neighborhoods in which crimes
are more likely to be committed by whites than blacks, then we might expect that, for the
city as a whole, white oﬃcers would be more likely than black oﬃcers to search the cars of
black motorists. We address both of these alternative explanations in the ﬁnal sections of
the paper.
The Model
In this section, we re-examine the model of police search presented in Knowles, Persico
and Todd (2001), and show that the fundamental insight that allows them to empirically
distinguish between preference-based discrimination and statistical discrimination hinges on
the specialized shapes of the best response functions in the game that they analyze.
Motorists are assumed to be either African-American or white, denoted by a and w,
respectively. In addition, motorists are distinguished by some characteristic, c, that is po-
tentially useful to the police in determining whether or not to search a motorist’s car. Im-
portantly, however, c may be not be perfectly observed by the econometrician. Of central
importance is whether it is possible to distinguish between statistical discrimination and
6preference-based discrimination even when the econometrician does not observe the full range
of motorist characteristics observed by the police.
In deciding whether or not to carry drugs, motorists weigh the beneﬁt of carrying drugs
against the penalty of being caught. If a driver does not carry drugs, then his payoﬀ is
assumed to be zero regardless of whether or not his car is searched. However, if a motorist
from racial group r carries drugs, then he faces cost −j(c,r) if his car is searched and beneﬁt
ν(c,r) if his car is not searched.
Let γ(c,r) be the probability the police search motorists of type (c,r). Thus, the expected
payoﬀ to carrying drugs for motorists of type (c,r) is given by
−γ(c,r)j(c,r) + [1 − γ(c,r)]ν(c,r).
Motorists are playing a best response to the search behavior of police if they carry drugs





The police cannot perfectly observe whether a motorist of type (c,r) is carrying drugs.
Instead, it is assumed that police maximize the expected payoﬀ from making an arrest minus
the cost of search. The beneﬁt to making an arrest is normalized to one so that the cost of
search is relative to the beneﬁt. Let tr be cost of searching a motorist from group r, where
it is assumed that 0 < tr < 1 to rule trivial equilibria.5
Let π(c,r) denote probability that a motorist of type (c,r) is carrying drugs. Thus, the
expected payoﬀ to oﬃcers from searching motorists of type (c,r) is given by
π(c,r) − tr.
Oﬃcers are playing a best response to the drug traﬃcking behavior of motorists if they search
whenever the above expression is greater than zero. Figure 1 graphs the best response
function for oﬃcers and motorists. For motorists of type (c,r), the line labelled γ(c,r)
represents the best response function of police and the line labelled π(c,r) represents the
best response function of motorists.
As the ﬁgure reveals, the best response functions in this game are equivalent to those in a
standard matching pennies game. Thus, for motorists of type (c, r), there is a unique mixed
strategy equilibrium of this game in which the search behavior of the police renders motorists
indiﬀerent between carrying drugs and not carrying drugs, and the drug traﬃcking behavior
5The model implicitly assumes that if the police search a motorist who has drugs, then the police will ﬁnd
the drugs. We discuss the more general case of imperfect search below.
7of motorists renders the police indiﬀerent between searching and not searching. That is, in





and the probability that motorists carry drugs is given by
π∗(c,r) = tr.
Since the police randomly select motorists from this group, the probability of guilt conditional
on search is exactly equal to π∗(c,r), the probability that motorists carry drugs.
Before analyzing how statistical discrimination and preference-based discrimination man-
ifest themselves in this model, it is worth enriching the model to allow for heterogeneity
in motorists’ utility from traﬃcking drugs.6 In particular, we assume that the beneﬁt to
carrying drugs is given by
−γ(c,r)j(c,r) + [1 − γ(c,r)]ν(c,r) − Z,
where Z represents an idiosyncratic cost of carrying drugs. Thus, letting G(·) denote the
distribution of Z in the population, the probability that motorists of type (c,r) traﬃc drugs
is given by
G(−γ(c,r)j(c,r) + [1 − γ(c,r)]ν(c,r)).
Figure 2 plots the corresponding best response functions for motorists and oﬃcers.
As in Knowles, Persico and Todd, we now examine the implications of statistical discrim-
ination and preference-based discrimination for the equilibrium of this model. Police oﬃcers
in this model are deﬁned to have discriminatory tastes if the cost of search varies by the race
of the motorist, so that ta 6= tw. For example, Figure 3 displays the best response functions
when oﬃcers discriminate against African-Americans so that ta < tw. As Figure 3 reveals,
if ta < tw, then, among motorists with characteristic c, the police will be more likely to
search African-Americans than whites (γ∗(c,a) > γ∗(c,w)), and African-Americans will be
less likely than whites to traﬃc drugs (π∗(c,a) < π∗(c,w)).
In this model, police statistically discriminate on the basis of race if, among motorists
with the same characteristic, c, the probability of search diﬀers by the race of the motorist
because of racial disparities in the propensity to carry drugs. This occurs whenever the net
beneﬁt of carrying drugs diﬀers by race. That is, if −j(c,r) and ν(c,r) vary by r, then so
will the equilibrium probability of search. Figure 4 shows an example in which, even among
6Knowles, Persico and Todd also discuss this extension on page 214 of their paper.
8motorists with the same observable characteristic, c, the net beneﬁt of carrying drugs is
higher for African Americans than it is for whites, but the cost of search is assumed to be
the same for all motorists, so that ta = tw = t. In this case, for any given search probability
γ, African-American are more likely than whites to carry drugs, and, as the ﬁgure reveals,
in equilibrium, the police are more likely to search African-American motorists than white
motorists (γ∗(c,a) > γ∗(c,w)). Importantly, however, the probability of guilt conditional on
search is independent of the motorists race (π∗(c,a) = π∗(c,w) = t).
Thus, in KPT, statistical discrimination has no eﬀect on the probability of guilt condi-
tional on search whereas preference-based discrimination does. In fact, as long as ta = tw = t,
the probability of guilt conditional on search will be the same for all motorists regardless of
their race and regardless of their observable characteristic, c. This is important since it
implies that the econometrician need not observe c to distinguish between statistical discrim-
ination and preference-based discrimination. That is, according to the logic of KPT, it is
only necessary to observe the probability of guilt conditional on search by race. Guilt proba-
bilities that diﬀer by oﬃcer race provide evidence in favor of preference-based discrimination.
Otherwise, diﬀerential search rates solely reﬂect statistical discrimination.
However, Figure 4 also makes clear the fact that the test that KPT adopt depends on the
specialized step-shaped best response function for police oﬃcers. Thus, any alteration to the
model that smoothes out the best response function for police oﬃcers will render their test
invalid. One such alteration is to allow the police to be heterogenous in their preferences
for search. Indeed, this type of heterogeneity is often used to justify the randomization that
characterizes most mixed-strategy equilibria (for example, see Harsanyi (1973)). In addition,
our data from Boston suggest that oﬃcers do vary in their preferences for search in the
sense that we observe substantial variation across oﬃcers in the likelihood that they search
motorists whom they have pulled over.
Formally, we assume that the cost of searching motorists from group r is given by tr +U,
where U captures a mean-zero, idiosyncratic search cost. With this cost, an oﬃcer is playing
a best response to motorists of type (c,r) if they search whenever
π(c,r) − tr − U > 0.
Letting H(·) denote the distribution of U among oﬃcers, the probability that optimizing
oﬃcers search is given by
H(π(c,r) − tr),
which is clearly increasing in π(c,r). Figure 5 plots best response functions with heterogeneity
in both motorist preferences for traﬃcking drugs and oﬃcer search costs. In this ﬁgure, we
9plot the best response function for both African-American and white motorists of type c under
the assumption that the net beneﬁt to traﬃcking drugs is higher for African-Americans than
it is whites and under the assumption that ta = tw = t.
As shown, statistical discrimination, like preference-based discrimination, now aﬀects
π∗(c,r), the probability of guilt conditional on search. Thus, in this generalized model, the
test that KPT employ no longer distinguishes between preference-based discrimination and
statistical discrimination.
In addition, even if there are no racial diﬀerences in the propensity to traﬃc drugs among
motorists with identical characteristics, problems will arise if the econometrician does not
observe the same set of characteristics as do the police and if those unobserved characteristics
are correlated with the race of motorists and the likelihood that motorists traﬃc drugs. For
example, suppose that the police are more likely to ﬁnd drugs in cars with tinted windows
than in those without. Then, if tinted windows are correlated with race and if the econo-
metrician cannot observe whether a motorist’s windows are tinted, there will be measured
racial diﬀerences in the probability of guilt conditional on search.
Another alteration to the model presented in KPT that leads to smooth, upward-sloping
best response functions for police oﬃcers is to assume, like Anwar and Fang (2004) and Bjerk
(2004), that oﬃcers can observe some characteristic, θ, that is correlated with the likelihood
that the motorist is guilty, but that (unlike c) is unknown to the motorist at the time that
he or she decides to traﬃc drugs. In can be shown that, in this setting, the best response
function for oﬃcers will have the same upward-sloping shape as the best response function
for oﬃcers in Figure 5.7 In addition, if oﬃcers are not able to perfectly observe some groups
of criminals (as suggested by Bjerk (2004) and Dharmapala and Ross (2004)), then this will
also aﬀect the step-shaped best response function of police oﬃcers.
An Alternative Test
In this section we propose a simple alternative test to distinguish between preference-based
discrimination and statistical discrimination. We start from the supposition that if oﬃcers
have discriminatory preferences, then those prejudices will be directed towards motorists who
are not members of that oﬃcer’s racial group. That is, the cost of search, t, will depend on
the match between the race of the oﬃcer and the race of the motorist. We assume that, like
motorists, oﬃcers belong to one of two racial groups: African-Americans and whites. Let tj
r
7The models in Anwar and Fang (2004) and Bjerk (2004) highlight the added problem that the guilt rate
for the marginal motorist will not equal the guilt rate for the average motorist. A complete analysis of how
these models aﬀect the shape of the best response functions is available upon request.
10denote the cost to oﬃcers from group j of searching motorists from group r.
Thus, the payoﬀ to oﬃcers from group j of searching motorists from group r becomes
π(c,r) − tj
r − U.
Let γj(c,r) denote the probability that oﬃcers from group j search motorists from group r
and let ρ denote the proportion of oﬃcers from who are African-American. Thus, the payoﬀ
to motorists from group r with idiosyncratic cost Z from traﬃcking drugs is given by
−γ(c,r)j(c,r) + [1 − γ(c,r)]ν(c,r) − Z,
where γ(c,r) = ργa(c,r) + (1 − ρ)γw(c,r).
An equilibrium for motorists of type (c,r) occurs at any π∗(c,r), γa∗(c,r), and γw∗(c,r)
such that
γa∗(c,r) = H(π∗(c,r) − ta
r)
γw∗(c,r) = H(π∗(c,r) − tw
r )
and
π∗(c,r) = G(−γ∗(c,r)j(c,r) + [1 − γ∗(c,r)]ν(c,r))
where γ∗(c,r) = ργa∗(c,r) + (1 − ρ)γw∗(c,r).
Figure 6 graphs the best response functions and the equilibrium outcome of this model
for motorists of type (c,r) under the assumption that tw
r < ta
r so that white oﬃcers ﬁnd it less
costly to search motorists from group r than do African-American oﬃcers. The notion here
is that white oﬃcers have discriminatory preferences against group r.8 As one might expect,
white oﬃcers will be more likely to search motorists from group r than will African-American
oﬃcers in equilibrium. By contrast, if ta
r = tw
r = t, then oﬃcers from both groups will be
equally likely to search motorists of type (c,r). Thus, one clear implication of the model is
that, in the absence of preference-based discrimination, there should be no diﬀerence in the
rate at which oﬃcers from diﬀerent racial group search drivers of type (c,r). This insight
forms the basis of the empirical strategy that we employ.
Empirical Strategy
In this section, we discuss how we test our model’s prediction. Recall that our model predicts
that, in the absence of preference-based discrimination, there should be no diﬀerence in the
rate at which oﬃcers from diﬀerent racial groups search motorists of type (c,r). Thus,
8Or, equivalently, that African-American oﬃcers exhibit favoritism towards group r.
11assuming that the oﬃcer’s race, the motorist’s race and c are known, this implication can
be tested. Below we discuss what happens if c is unobserved. However, in order to establish
the link between our model and our empirical strategy, it is useful to start with the case in
which c is observed.
In order to motivate the probit model that we employ, recall that oﬃcers of race j search







Note that equilibrium guilty probabilities [π(c,r)] are independent of oﬃcer race, which is
revealed to drivers in the model only after the decision over whether or not to carry drugs
has been made; this independence is key to our identiﬁcation strategy.9
In order to identify racial prejudice separately by oﬃcer race, we would ideally estimate
the following fully-speciﬁed probit model:
Pr(search|j,c,r) = H (β0 + β1c + β21[j = a] + β31[r = a] + β41[j = a,r = w] + β51[j = w,r = a]),
Unfortunately, the parameters of this fully speciﬁed model cannot be estimated as the model
is perfectly collinear. To see this, take the diﬀerence between the ﬁnal two regressors:
∆ = 1[j = a] × 1[r = w] − 1[j = w] × 1[r = a] = 1[j = a] − 1[r = a]
Thus, this diﬀerence (∆) equals a linear combination of the ﬁrst two regressors. Our inability
to estimate this fully speciﬁed model is not surprising since, even if c is a constant, there are
only four possible cases of driver / oﬃcer interactions but ﬁve parameters. We can, however,
feasibly estimate the following restricted model:
Pr(search|j,c,r) = H (β0 + β1c + β21[j = a] + β31[r = a] + β4mismatch),
where mismatch = 1[j = a,r = w] + 1[j = w,r = a] indicates a traﬃc stop in which
the race of the oﬃcer diﬀers from the race of the driver. Given that we cannot identify





a ).10 Under this assumption, we can write the following
relationships between the theoretical and empirical speciﬁcations for this restricted model:11
9Drivers do, however, know the distribution of oﬃcer race, which is assumed to be the same for all
motorists.
10If blacks and whites are not equally prejudiced, then our estimates will uncover the average level of
prejudice across black and white oﬃcers.
11In order to derive these relationships, consider the following four possible cases of driver/oﬃcer inter-
actions for both the theoretical and empirical models: 1) j = w,r = w, 2) j = a,r = a,3) j = w,r = a,4)
j = a,r = w. One can then show that β0 + β1c = π(c,w) + tw
w. Using this relationship, the three key




a Cost diﬀerences by oﬃcer race






With data on the race of both the driver and the oﬃcer, we can thus distinguish between
racial proﬁling based upon statistical discrimination, which is captured by the coeﬃcient on
driver race (β3), and racial proﬁling based upon prejudice, which is captured by the coeﬃcient
on mismatch (β4).
Consider next the case in which driver characteristics (c) are unobserved to the econo-
metrician. We show below that, under assumptions of normality and random matching of
oﬃcers and drivers, our approach retains the ability to distinguish between racial prejudice
and statistical discrimination even if unobserved driver characteristics are correlated with
driver race. Intuitively, the coeﬃcient on driver race absorbs any unobserved diﬀerences
between black and white drivers, and the coeﬃcient on mismatch is thus not contaminated
by the presence of these unobserved characteristics.
Recall that, according to the probit model, oﬃcers search if the following expression holds:
β0 + β1c + β21[j = a] + β31[r = a] + β4mismatch − U > 0
where U ∼ N(0,1). Assume next that unobserved driver characteristics are normally dis-
tributed with a mean that varies by race:
c = cr − σε,r = a,w
where ε ∼ N(0,1) and is assumed to be independent of both driver race (r) and oﬃcer
characteristics (U,j).12 As shown in Yatchew and Griliches (1985), without the normality
assumption, which is made here for reasons of tractability, the presence of unobserved char-
acteristics leads to complicated asymptomatic bias formulas in probit models.13 We refer
12The assumption that c is a scalar is not crucial and can be generalized. In particular, allow an N×1 vector
of unobserved driver characteristics (C) to vary according to driver race and a random vector: C = Cr − E,
where Cr and E are both N × 1 vectors, and the components of E are assumed to be distributed jointly
normal with covariance matrix Σ. In this case, the unconditional probit can be written as follows:
Pr(search|j,r) = H
"





where β1 is now a 1 × N vector.
13In particular, the asymptotic bias formulas depend on the cumulative distribution function for unobserved
13to the assumption of independence between unobserved driver characteristics and mismatch
as random matching. This random matching assumption will be satisﬁed if  is uncorrelated
with j and r. We address the validity of this assumption in the empirical analysis to follow
by studying how police oﬃcers are assigned to neighborhoods in Boston.14
Substituting in the above expression for unobserved driver characteristics, oﬃcers of race
j search drivers of race r if:
β0 + β1cw + β21[j = a] + [β3 + β1(ca − cw)]1[r = a] + β4mismatch − U − σβ1ε > 0
Under the assumption that U and ε are independently distributed, U−σβ1ε ∼ N(0,1+β2
1σ2)
and the probability of search, unconditional on driver characteristics, is given as follows:
Pr(search|j,r) = H
"






We can thus deﬁne the unconditional probit parameters (γ0,γ2,γ3,γ4) as follows:
γ0 =
















Using these deﬁnitions and the relationships listed above between the theoretical parameters
and the probit parameters conditional on driver characteristics, we can thus relate the probit
parameters unconditional on driver characteristics to the theoretical parameters as follows:
characteristics. Applying this lesson to our analysis, if traﬃc stops in which the race of the driver diﬀers
from the race of the oﬃcer are also stops in which drivers disproportionately carry drugs, then the coeﬃcient
on mismatch could be asympotically biased in either direction.
14Without the assumption of random matching, our empirical strategy no longer directly measures racial
prejudice. Suppose, for example, that unobserved characteristics are correlated with mismatch so that
c = cr + ηmismatch−σε. In this case, the probit speciﬁcation is given as follows:
Pr(search|j,r) = H
"
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These relationships yield several key insights. First, results from the case in which the
econometrician observes and does not observe driver characteristics are identical if oﬃcers
do not rely on driver characteristics in their search decisions (β1 = 0). In addition, if
there is no heterogeneity other than race in unobserved characteristics (σ = 0), then the
coeﬃcients on oﬃcer race and mismatch are unchanged. The coeﬃcient on driver race (γ3),
however, is altered and now captures both statistical discrimination based purely upon race
[π(c,a) − π(c,w)] and statistical discrimination based upon driver characteristics that vary
according to race (β1(ca −cw)); without further information, we cannot distinguish between
these two forms of statistical discrimination. However, even if β1 6= 0 and σ 6= 0, our
approach retains the ability to distinguish between statistical discrimination, in whatever





1σ2). In fact, the presence of
unobserved driver characteristics only serves to bias our analysis away from measuring racial
prejudice due to the scaling factor (
p
1 + β2
1σ2), which exceeds one.
Data
In July 2000, the Massachusetts legislature passed Chapter 228 of the Acts of 2000, An Act
Providing for the Collection of Data Relative to Traﬃc Stops. Among other things, this
statute requires that, eﬀective April 1, 2001, the Registry of Motor Vehicles collect data on
the identifying characteristics of all individuals who receive a citation or who are arrested.
The data collected by the State contain a wide variety of information including: the age, race
and gender of the driver, the year, make and model of the car, the time, date and location of
the stop, the alleged traﬃc infraction, whether a search was initiated and whether the stop
resulted in an arrest.
The statute also required the Registry of Motor Vehicles to collect data on warnings.
However, citing budgetary shortfalls, the Registry only compiled data on warnings for two
months. Thus, for most of the time period under investigation, we do not observe stops for
which an oﬃcer issued either a written or a verbal warning. That is, unless an oﬃcer issued
a citation, the stop does not appear in our data outside of the two-month period. If oﬃcers
15favor members of their own racial group, then we might expect oﬃcers to issue citations
to members of their own racial group only if they have committed relatively serious traﬃc
infractions or if the oﬃcer strongly suspects that the driver is traﬃcking drugs. If so, then
our estimates will tend to understate the extent of the racial bias in search patterns. We will
address this data limitation later in the analysis by restricting our sample to the two-month
period that includes data on warnings.
In addition to the citation-level data collected by the State, we were also able to obtain
oﬃcer-level data from the Boston Police Department. These data contain, among other
things, information on the oﬃcer’s race, gender, rank and number of years on the force. For
the subset of citations issued by oﬃcers in the Boston Police Department, we are then able to
match the oﬃcer-level data to the citation-level data collected by the state. In total, we are
able to match oﬃcer-level data to over 112,473 citations issued by 1,369 oﬃcers, representing
just over 80 percent of the citations issued by oﬃcers in the Boston Police Department in
our data. That is, for approximately 20 percent of the citations issued by an oﬃcer in the
Boston Police Department in our data, we were unable to identify the oﬃcer who issued the
citation.
We restrict our sample in a number of ways. First, we drop a small number of citations
(6) for which contradictory race information was recorded. In addition, we drop citations
issued by Asian oﬃcers (23 oﬃcers in total), and 8,051 citations issued to Asian, Native
American and Middle Eastern motorists. As a result, all of the motorists and oﬃcers in our
data are either black, white or Hispanic. Finally, we drop a small number of citations (10)
that were issued to motorists outside the city of Boston in one of the surrounding suburbs.
This may have happened, for example, if an oﬃcer followed a speeding driver outside of the
city limits. Once these restrictions have been made we are left with 100,408 citations issued
by 1,335 oﬃcers.
Of considerable concern is the fact that the search variable is missing for over 18 percent
of the citations in our data. When ﬁlling out a citation, oﬃcers are required to check either
“yes” or “no” to indicate whether a search was conducted. If an oﬃcer neglected to check
either box, then the search variable is missing in our data. We do not know why oﬃcers
failed to check this box. One possibility is that they were careless. Another is that they
did not fully understand how to ﬁll out the citation and generally only checked the “yes”
box if they conducted a search but otherwise left the question blank. Interestingly, there is
signiﬁcant variation across oﬃcers in the proportion of citations for which the search variable
is left missing; some oﬃcers appear to have been better at accurately ﬁlling out the citation
16than others. There are a number of ways of dealing with these missing values. We pick the
method that we think is the best and then check to make sure that our results are robust
to alternative procedures. In our baseline speciﬁcation, if the oﬃcer indicated that a search
was conducted for all citations in which search was non-missing, then we assume that if the
search variable is missing, then no search was conducted. Then, we drop all oﬃcers for whom
search is missing for more than 10 percent of the citations that those oﬃcers issue. Doing
so eliminates approximately 25 percent of the citations (and 48 percent of the oﬃcers) in
our data. For the remaining 684 oﬃcers, we drop observations for which search is missing,
and are left with a sample comprising 72,903 citations. Tables 1 and 2 were calculated using
our baseline search measure. In the next section, we discuss our robustness checks in greater
detail.
Table 3 presents some basic summary statistics. The ﬁrst column includes only those
citations for which our baseline search measure is missing, whereas the second column includes
only those citations for which our baseline search measure is available. Thus, comparing
these ﬁrst two columns provides some idea as to whether the citations for which search is
missing diﬀer systematically from those where it is not. Among citations for which search
is missing, accidents are about twice as likely to have occurred as among citations for which
search is not missing. There is also some variation across the ﬁrst two columns in the
percentage of citations that are issued in each neighborhood, reﬂecting the fact that oﬃcers
in some districts were less likely to leave the search question blank than were oﬃcers in other
districts. Otherwise, citations for which the search variable is missing appear to be quite
similar to those for which it is not.15 The last three columns of Table 3 show the average
characteristics of the citations in our sample broken down by the race of the oﬃcer issuing
the citation. Interestingly, we see that oﬃcers disproportionately issue citations to motorists
from their own racial group. As we will see below, this may reﬂect the fact that oﬃcers
are more likely to issue tickets in districts in which a large portion of the population (and
so, presumably, the drivers) are in the same racial group as the oﬃcer. Indeed, this is also
reﬂected in the fact that there is variation across the last three columns in the proportion of
citations issued in diﬀerent neighborhoods. Finally, we see that black oﬃcers are more likely
to issue citations at night and less likely to issue citations at which an accident has occurred
than either white or Hispanic oﬃcers.
15We also estimated probit models for whether or not the search variable was missing as a function of oﬃcer
and driver characteristics. The mismatch coeﬃcient turns out to be negative but statistically insigniﬁcant.
This insigniﬁcance suggests that the omission of missing observations is not driving our results. Even if the
coeﬃcient were statistically signiﬁcant, this result would only serve to bias us against ﬁnding preference-based
discrimination under the assumption that non-searches were more likely to be coded as missing observations.
That is, our data are missing non-searches in which the race of the oﬃcer and driver were likely to match.
17Search Patterns in the Boston Police Department
In this section we test our model’s theoretical predictions. For the time being we abstract
from the possibility that there exist racial diﬀerences in oﬃcers’ abilities to assess the guilt of
motorists from diﬀerent racial groups and the possibility that oﬃcers may be non-randomly
matched with motorists from diﬀerent racial groups.
We start by replicating the results presented in KPT. To do so, we use a probit model to
study the probability of search and the probability of guilt conditional on search. In order
to determine how the probability of search and the probability of guilt conditional on search
diﬀer depending on the race of the driver, we include indicator variables for whether the
driver is black or Hispanic (so that white drivers are our omitted category). We also include
as controls indicator variables for whether the stop occurred at night (6pm-5am), whether
the driver was below the age of 25, whether the driver was male, whether the driver was from
in state, whether the driver was from in town and whether an accident had occurred. In
addition, we include dummy variables that control for the district in which the stop occurred.
In Table 4 (and in all remaining relevant tables) we report the estimated marginal impact
of each variable on the probability of search. Column 1 presents the results from the probit
model of the probability of search, and column 2 presents the results for the probability of
guilt conditional on search. In these ﬁrst two columns, each citation receives equal weight.
However, concern that these results are driven by a small number of oﬃcers who issue an
unusually large number of citations prompted us to repeat the analysis in columns 1 and
2, but instead weight each citation by one over the number of citations given by the oﬃcer
issuing that citation. The last two columns of Table 4 present the results of these weighted
probits.
As will be seen, our results are sometimes sensitive to whether or not we weight citations
in this fashion. In fact, the merits of weighting depend upon the question that you wish
to answer. If you are interested in understanding the behavior of the average oﬃcer, the
weighted probits provide a better description of the data since oﬃcers who issue a large
number of tickets do not exert a disproportionate impact on the estimates. On the other
hand, if you are interested in understanding search outcomes for the average motorist who
receives a citation, then the unweighted probits are more appropriate. In this paper, we
are interested in understanding the search decisions of oﬃcers and, in particular, whether
their behavior is consistent with preference-based discrimination. Thus, we believe that
the results of the weighted probits are appropriate. For several reasons, however, we do
present robustness checks using the unweighted probits. First, describing search outcomes
18for the average motorist is interesting in its own right. Second, diﬀerences between the
weighted and unweighted probits, and the concomitant diﬀerences in the interpretation of
the results, highlight the fact that citation-level data (even if oﬃcer race is available) may
lead to misleading results if it is not possible to account for the fact that oﬃcers who issue
a large number of tickets will be over-represented in the sample.
As the ﬁrst column of the table indicates, black drivers are signiﬁcantly more likely to
have their cars searched than are white drivers. This result also holds for the weighted probit
in column 3. In addition, like Knowles, Persico and Todd, we ﬁnd no evidence that the
probability of guilt conditional on search diﬀers depending on the race of the driver. In
particular, in both columns 2 and 4, the coeﬃcient of the indicator variable for whether the
driver is black is close to zero and not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Table 5 is identical to
Table 4 except that it drops citations for which either the oﬃcer or the driver was Hispanic.
The results are very similar to those in Table 4.
KPT interpret the ﬁnding that the probability of guilt conditional on search is identical
across racial groups as evidence against preference-based discrimination. However, as the
discussion in the preceding section highlights, once the model of KPT is generalized to allow
for heterogeneity in oﬃcer search costs, this prediction no longer holds.
However, our model delivers an alternative method for distinguishing between preference-
based discrimination and statistical discrimination. In particular, as discussed above, the
model predicts that if statistical discrimination alone explains diﬀerences in the rate at which
African-American and white drivers are pulled over, then there should be no diﬀerence in the
rate at which oﬃcers from diﬀerent racial groups search drivers from any given racial group.
In order to determine how search patterns depend on the interaction between the race of the
driver and the race of the oﬃcer, we again use a probit model to analyze the probability of
search. Here, in addition to controlling for the race of the driver, we also include indicator
variables for the race of the oﬃcer as well as an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the
race of the oﬃcer diﬀers from the race of the driver (we call this indicator “mismatch”).
Table 6 presents our results. In the ﬁrst three columns, each citation receives equal weight,
and each column includes a progressively broader set of controls. The last three columns are
identical to the ﬁrst three, except that in the last three columns each citation is weighted by
one over the number of citations given by the oﬃcer issuing the citation. In all six columns,
the coeﬃcient on our mismatch indicator is positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero at
standard conﬁdence levels. Thus, our results indicate that oﬃcers are more likely to search
motorists who are not members of the oﬃcer’s racial group. As mentioned before, this ﬁnding
19is inconsistent with standard models of statistical discrimination. In addition, our results also
suggest that Hispanic oﬃcers are more likely to conduct searches than white oﬃcers, and the
second and third columns suggest that oﬃcers are more likely to search motorists if they are
black, young or involved in an accident. Table 7 presents the results from the same analysis
as in Table 6 except that stops involving either Hispanic oﬃcers or Hispanic motorists are
excluded from the sample. Again, in all six columns the coeﬃcient estimate on the mismatch
parameter is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at standard conﬁdence levels.
As mentioned previously, our estimates may be biased if the mismatch between the race of
the oﬃcer and the race of the motorist is correlated with motorist characteristics (c) that are
not included in our regressions. Thus, it is comforting that the point estimate on mismatch
changes very little as we add more regressors, suggesting that mismatch tends not to be
correlated with unobserved motorist characteristics. We investigate this potential bias more
fully below by empirically analyzing the assignment of oﬃcers to neighborhoods in Boston.
Note that a positive coeﬃcient on our mismatch parameter could be driven, for example,
by discrimination on the part of white oﬃcers against black drivers or by discrimination on
the part of black oﬃcers against white drivers. As noted above, however, we cannot identify
diﬀerences in racial prejudice by oﬃcer race. Thus, for example, our results should not be
taken as evidence that black motorists in the Boston area are the subject to discrimination
by oﬃcers in the Boston Police Department. Rather, our results simply indicate that the
interaction between the race of the motorist and the race of the oﬃcer is signiﬁcantly related
to the probability that the motorist is searched, and we argue that this pattern is consistent
with preference-based discrimination.16
As mentioned earlier, the search variable is missing for over 18 percent of the citations
in our data. In order to make sure that our results are not sensitive to the way in which we
treat these missing values, we conduct a number of robustness checks, the results of which
are presented in Table 8. In the ﬁrst column, we run the same basic speciﬁcation as above
with our full set of controls, but include in the analysis citations issued by oﬃcers for whom
the search variable is missing in more than 10 percent of the citations issued by that oﬃcer.
In the second column, we assume that if search was missing, then no search was conducted.
The motivation for this assumption is the notion that oﬃcers may be more likely to leave
the search question blank if no search was conducted. This obviously increases our sample
size substantially. Finally, in column 3, we repeat the analysis in column 1 except that if
16Anwar and Fang (2004) apply a similar test to data from Florida and reach similar conclusions. Anwar
and Fang base their test on a somewhat diﬀerent theoretical model and the test that they propose is more
stringent than the one we use here, but our conclusions would not change if we applied their test to our data.
20all of an oﬃcer’s non-missing search citations indicate that a search was conducted, then we
assume that no search was conducted for all of the missing observations. As shown, the
point estimates drop in size relative to the comparable estimate using our baseline search
measure. However, the mismatch coeﬃcient remains statistically diﬀerent from zero at the
99 percent conﬁdence level.
Table 9 repeats the analysis in Table 8, except that it does not include stops that involve
either Hispanic oﬃcers or Hispanic motorists. In all three columns, the coeﬃcient on the
mismatch indicator is positive and is statistically diﬀerent from zero at standard conﬁdence
levels.
Recall that in our baseline search measure we drop oﬃcers for whom the search variable
is missing for more than 10 percent of the citations issued by that oﬃcer. Although we do
not present these results, we have also experimented with changing that 10 percent cutoﬀ.
Lowering the cutoﬀ (to say 5 percent or 3 percent), tends to strengthen our results, while
increasing the cutoﬀ tends to weaken them. This is reﬂected in column 1 of Tables 8 and 9
where the cutoﬀ is eﬀectively 100 percent (all oﬃcers are included).
Approximately 82 percent of the oﬃcers in our data are patrol oﬃcers. The remaining
oﬃcers are some manner of either Deputies, Detectives, Sergeants or Captains. We lack
information on how an oﬃcer’s duties vary according to his or her rank and, more importantly,
we do not know how rank aﬀects ticketing behavior (although it’s clear that high-ranking
oﬃcers issue fewer tickets). Thus, in Table 10, we repeat the analysis in Table 6, but restrict
attention to citations that are issued by Patrol Oﬃcers. In all three columns, the coeﬃcient
on the mismatch indicator are positive, similar in magnitude to the comparable estimates
in Table 6, and are statistically diﬀerent from zero at standard levels. Table 11 repeats
the analysis in Table 10 but excludes citations in which either the oﬃcer or the motorist is
Hispanic. Again. the point estimates on the mismatch indicator are similar in magnitude
to those in Table 7, but are statistically diﬀerent from zero (at the 90 percent conﬁdence
level) in only two out of the three columns. Overall, we take the results in Tables 10 and
11 as evidence that our results are not driven by idiosyncratic policing practices among
higher-ranking oﬃcers.
As noted above, our data only include warnings for the two-month period of April-May
2001. In order to determine whether selection on the oﬃcer’s decision to issue tickets
or warnings is driving our ﬁndings of preference-based discrimination, we next restrict our
sample to those stops within this two-month period. As shown in Table 12, the coeﬃcient
on the mismatch variable is larger than those in the baseline analysis in Table 6. While the
21standard errors are also larger, probably reﬂecting the diminished sample size, the coeﬃcients
remain statistically signiﬁcant at the 90 percent level.17 Taken together, these robustness
checks demonstrate that our ﬁndings of preference-based discrimination are not driven by
observations with missing search variables, patrol oﬃcer versus non-patrol oﬃcer distinctions,
or selection on the oﬃcer’s decision to issue warnings or tickets. In the remainder of the
paper, we address other alternative explanations for our ﬁndings: informational asymmetries
and the assignment of oﬃcers to neighborhoods.
Asymmetric Search Ability
One concern is that our results may be driven by the fact that oﬃcers may be more successful
at ﬁnding drugs in cars that are driven by motorists who are in their own racial group. For
example, Donohue and Levitt (2001) ﬁnd evidence that own-race policing may be more
eﬃcient than cross-race policing. To see how this would aﬀect our model, let φj
r denote the
probability that an oﬃcer from group j is successful of searching a motorist from group r;
the baseline model is one in which this probability equals one for all oﬃcers and drivers. In
this generalized model, the payoﬀ to an oﬃcer from group j to searching a motorist from
group r is given by
φj
rP(G|c,r) − tr − U
It should be clear from the above expression that the higher is φj
r, the higher will be the
beneﬁt to oﬃcers from group j of searching a motorist from group r. Thus, if oﬃcers are
better at ﬁnding drugs when the motorist is a member of the oﬃcer’s own racial group, then
we would expect oﬃcers to be more likely to search motorists from their own racial group
and our estimates will tend to understate the extent of preference-based discrimination.18
This result is shown graphically in Figure 7.
In order to empirically address the possibility that asymmetric information drives our
results, we examine whether our results hold among oﬃcers with more than 10 years of
experience on the force. The hypothesis is that oﬃcers who have had substantial amounts of
17Although the results are not presented here, we also examined oﬃcer decisions over whether to issue
warnings or tickets during this two-month period. Warnings were less likely to be issued if there was a
mismatch between the race of the oﬃcer and the race of the driver, although this coeﬃcient was statistically
insigniﬁcant. As discussed earlier, however, this ﬁnding would only serve to bias our results against ﬁnding
preference-based discrimination during the post-warnings period.
18Like Anwar and Fang (2004) and Bjerk (2004) we have also considered a model in which oﬃcers observe
a noisy signal of a motorist’s guilt that is unknown to motorists at the time they make their decision about
whether to carry drugs, but that is correlated with the likelihood that they traﬃc drugs. One might expect
oﬃcers to receive more informative signals from motorists who are in the oﬃcer’s racial group than from
those who are not. In an appendix available from the authors upon request, we show that changes in the
information content of the signal deliver ambiguous predictions about search behavior.
22experience should be equally able to search the cars of motorists from diﬀerent racial groups.
The notion is that, oﬃcers become better at searching motorists from a particular group as
exposure to that group increases. Thus, provided these improvements happen at a decreasing
rate, experienced oﬃcers should be equally talented at searching motorists, irrespective of
race.
Table 13 presents the results of our weighted probits; the ﬁrst three columns focus on
citations issued by oﬃcers with less than 10 years of experience while the last three columns
focus on citations issued by oﬃcers with more than 10 years of experience. We chose 10 years
of experience as our cutoﬀ because it is close to the average experience level of oﬃcers in
our data, approximately 12 years. However, our results are not sensitive to the exact cutoﬀ
experience level that we employ.
As shown, the coeﬃcients on the mismatch indicator are small and statistically insigniﬁ-
cant for inexperienced oﬃcers but large and statistically signiﬁcant for experienced oﬃcers.
Thus, these results suggests that our ﬁndings of preference-based discrimination are not
driven by diﬀerences in the ability of oﬃcers to accurately search the cars of motorists from
their own racial group. Rather, this analysis suggests that our results are stronger when we
examine only experienced oﬃcers, for whom we would expect the likelihood of a successful
search to be independent of the match between the oﬃcer’s race and the driver’s race.
Unobserved Driver Characteristics and the Assignment
of Oﬃcers to Neighborhoods
As mentioned earlier, if there is some relevant characteristic, c, that is not included in our
regressions and that is correlated with mismatch, then our estimate of β4, the coeﬃcient on
mismatch, may be biased. One of the most plausible explanations for the source of this bias
is that oﬃcers may not be randomly assigned to diﬀerent neighborhoods within the city.
Suppose, for example, that white oﬃcers are disproportionately assigned to neighborhoods
in which blacks commit a large fraction of the drug traﬃcking oﬀenses. As a result, we would
expect white oﬃcers to be more likely than black oﬃcers to search the cars of black motorists,
even in the absence of preference-based discrimination. From a public relations perspective, it
seems unlikely that oﬃcers would be assigned to neighborhoods in this fashion. Nonetheless,
it is worth examining how the Department allocates oﬃcers across the city.
Oﬃcers in the Boston Police Department are assigned to one of 11 districts. These
districts correspond to well-deﬁned geographic areas within the city and are the primary
organizational units for the Department. Figure 8 indicates both the name and location
23of these 11 districts. In addition, the Boston Police Department has a “Same Cop Same
Neighborhood” (or “SC/SN”) policing policy. Under SC/SN, patrol oﬃcers are assigned to a
neighborhood beat within each district, and spend no less than 60 percent of their shift in that
beat. The intent of SC/SN is to enable oﬃcers to become familiar with the local community
to which they are assigned and, thus, be more eﬀective at preventing crime. Unfortunately,
while our data contain information on the district to which an oﬃcer was assigned at the
time he or she issues a citation, we lack information on the oﬃcer’s neighborhood beat.
In Table 14, we compare the racial composition of the population aged 18 and over in
each district with the racial composition of the oﬃcers who are assigned to that district. As
the table shows, in districts in which a relatively large percentage of the population is white,
a relatively large proportion of the oﬃcers assigned to that district are white. Similarly, in
districts in which a relatively large proportion of the population is black, a relatively large
proportion of the oﬃcers assigned to that district is black, and the same pattern holds for
Hispanics. For whites, the correlation between the fraction of the population aged 18 and
older in each district who is white and the fraction of oﬃcers in that district who is white is
0.751. For blacks, Asian and Hispanics the analogous correlations are 0.844, 0.575 and 0.885,
respectively. To some extent, these patterns may reﬂect intentional assignment patterns
on the part of oﬃcials at the Boston Police Department. However, oﬃcers also have some
discretion about the district to which they are assigned. In any case, oﬃcers appear to patrol
areas in which the majority of residents are members of the oﬃcer’s racial group.
However, even if oﬃcers tend to be assigned to districts in which the majority of resi-
dents are members of their own racial group, mismatch may be inherently correlated with
the likelihood that the motorist is guilty. For example, if African-Americans go to predomi-
nantly white neighborhoods to sell drugs and if whites go to predominantly African-American
neighborhoods to buy drugs19, then oﬃcers in predominantly white neighborhoods may de-
liberately target African-American motorists and oﬃcers in black predominantly black neigh-
borhoods may deliberately target white motorists. As a result, a mismatch between the race
of the motorist and the race of the oﬃcer may be correlated with the likelihood that a
motorist is traﬃcking drugs.
In order to address this concern, Tables 15 and 16 provide results from only those traﬃc
stops in which the motorist was a resident of the district in which he or she was pulled
over. Presumably, when an oﬃcer stops a motorist, the oﬃcer can observe (by looking at
the motorist’s driver’s license) whether the motorist is a resident of the district and, thus,
19Here we deliberately appeal to racial stereotypes about who buys and who sells drugs.
24whether he or she is a “suspicious outsider”. As the Tables reveal, for all racial groups and
for the sample that includes only African-Americans and whites, the coeﬃcient on mismatch
remains positive and is statistically diﬀerent from zero in all six speciﬁcations. Thus, even if
we focus on stops that take place in the district in which the motorist resides, we ﬁnd that
oﬃcers are more likely to conduct a search if the motorist is not a member of the oﬃcer’s
racial group.
In addition, in Tables 17 and 18, we break districts down into two categories: those that
are racially diverse and those that are racially homogeneous. Using Table 14, we catego-
rize East Boston, Roxbury/Mission Hill, Jamaica Plain and Hyde Park as diverse, while we
categorize Boston Central (A-1 and D-4), South Boston, Allston/Brighton and West Rox-
bury/Roslindale as homogeneous.20 We drop citations that were issued in Dorchester and
North Dorchester because these districts diﬀer substantially in their racial composition and
our data do not allow us to distinguish between the two. On balance, our results are some-
what stronger in racially homogeneous neighborhoods, suggesting that the police may target
motorists whose race does not match the race of the average resident. However, even in the
racially diverse districts the point estimate on the mismatch parameter is always positive
and is statistically diﬀerent from zero in three out of six speciﬁcations. The loss in power is
likely to be driven by the reduced sample sizes when focusing on diverse districts.
Thus, Tables 14-18, provide evidence that our results are not driven by unobserved driver
characteristics and the non-random assignment of oﬃcers to diﬀerent districts within the
city.
Conclusion
Between April 2001 and January 2003, over 43 percent of all searches conducted by oﬃcers
from the Boston Police Department were of cars driven by African-American motorists even
though cars driven by African-Americans made up less then 33 percent of the cars that
were pulled over. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is statistical discrimination.
Another is preference-based discrimination. In this paper, we develop a test that allows us
to distinguish between these two hypotheses.
We start by generalizing the model of police search developed in Knowles, Persico and
Todd (2001) to include heterogeneity in oﬃcer search costs; under this generalized model, the
fundamental insight that allows KPT to distinguish between preference-based discrimination
and statistical discrimination falls away. In particular, we show that even in the absence
20Charlestown in included in East Boston.
25of preference-based discrimination, there is no reason to expect the probability of guilt con-
ditional on search to be the same across racial groups. However, we suggest an alternative
test for distinguishing between statistical discrimination and preference-based discrimination.
Our model predicts that if statistical discrimination alone accounts for racial disparities in the
rate at which motorists from diﬀerent racial groups are subject to search, then there should
be no diﬀerence in the rate at which oﬃcers from diﬀerent racial groups search drivers from
any given group.
We test this hypothesis using data from the Boston Police Department. Our results
strongly suggest that oﬃcers are more likely to conduct a search if the race of the motorist
diﬀers from the race of the oﬃcer. We then test whether this pattern could be explained
by diﬀerences in the ability of oﬃcers from diﬀerent racial groups to assess the guilt of
motorists from a particular racial group. We ﬁnd no evidence that this sort of informational
asymmetry explains our results. We also show that the manner by which oﬃcers are assigned
to neighborhoods within the city does not account for our empirical ﬁndings. Rather, our
results suggest that preference-based discrimination plays a signiﬁcant role in explaining
diﬀerences in the rate at which motorists from diﬀerent racial groups are searched during
traﬃc stops.
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Figure 3: Preference-Based Discrimination in KPT Model
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30Figure 7: Asymmetric Search Ability
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A-1    Downtown/Beacon Hill/Chinatown/Charlestown  
A-7    East Boston  
B-2    Roxbury/Mission Hill 
B-3    Mattapan/North Dorchester 
C-6    South Boston  
C-11  Dorchester 
D-4    Back Bay/Sound End/Fenway 
D-14  Allston/Brighton 
E-5     West Roxbury/Roslindale 
E-13   Jamaica Plain 
E-18   Hyde Park  
 
31Table 1: Probability of Search by Oﬃcer Race and Driver Race
(Standard Deviation of Sample Mean in Parentheses)
Driver Race White Black Hispanic All
White  0.41% 0.67% 0.24% 0.47%
(0.04%) (0.08%) (0.08%) (0.04%)
n=23359 n=11399 n=3370 n=38128
Black 1.00% 0.81% 0.47% 0.88%
(0.09%) (0.09%) (0.14%) (0.06%)
n=13533 n=9326 n=2339 n=25198 
Hispanic 1.01% 0.80% 0.36% 0.87%
(0.14%) (0.16%) (0.18%) (0.09%)
n=5233 n=3237 n=1105 n=9575
All 0.65% 0.72% 0.38% 0.65%
(0.04%) (0.05%) (0.07%) (0.03%)
n=45755 n=25392 n=7181 n= 78328 
Officer Race
Note: Stops made by Asian officers are not inlcuded.   Includes only officers for whom the 
search variable is missing for at most 10% of all citations.  Stops involving drivers from other 
racial groups are included in the "All" category. 
Table 2: Probability of Search by Oﬃcer Race and Driver Race
Weighted by Inverse of Number of Citations
(Standard Deviation of Sample Mean in Parentheses)
Driver Race White Black Hispanic All
White  1.91% 2.54% 2.50% 2.09%
(0.53%) (0.56%) (2.10%) (0.42%)
n=404 n=139 n=46 n=589
Black 5.05% 2.04% 0.48% 3.95%
(1.05%) (0.91%) (0.22%) (0.74%)
n=364 n=137 n=42 n=543
Hispanic 4.89% 4.55% 0.28% 4.34%
(1.64%) (2.43%) (0.16%) (1.23%)
n=265 n=111 n=37 n=413
All 3.19% 2.78% 1.38% 2.96%
(0.47%) (0.56%) (0.98%) (0.36%)
n=473 n=164 n=52 n=689
Officer Race
Note: Stops made by Asian officers are not inlcuded.  Includes only officers for whom the search 
variable is missing for at most 10% of all citations. Stops involving drivers from other racial 
groups are included in the "All" category.  For each officer, observations weighted by one over 
the number of citations given by that officer.
32Table 3: Summary Statistics




All Officers All Officers White Officers Black Officers Hispanic Officers
White Driver 56.7% 52.3% 55.5% 47.6% 49.5%
(49.5%) (49.9%) (49.7%) (49.9%) (50.0%)
Black Driver 31.1% 34.6% 32.1% 38.9% 34.3%
(46.3%) (47.6%) (46.7%) (48.8%) (47.5%)
Hispanic Driver 12.1% 13.1% 12.4% 13.5% 16.2%
(32.7%) (33.8%) (33.0%) (34.2%) (36.9%)
Mismatch 49.4% 53.6% 44.5% 61.1% 83.8%
(50.0%) (49.9%) (49.7%) (48.8%) (36.9%)
Baseline Search - 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.3%
(8.1%) (8.2%) (8.6%) (36.9%)
Stop at Night 32.1% 30.7% 27.0% 37.3% 30.9%
(46.7%) (46.1%) (44.4%) (48.4%) (46.2%)
Young Driver (Age<26) 25.0% 24.3% 24.2% 23.8% 26.3%
(43.3%) (42.9%) (42.8%) (42.6%) (44.0%)
Male Driver 71.8% 68.1% 69.3% 65.6% 69.9%
(45.0%) (46.6%) (46.1%) (47.5%) (45.9%)
In-State Driver 93.3% 93.2% 92.9% 93.8% 93.0%
(25.0%) (25.2%) (25.8%) (24.2%) (25.4%)
In-Town Driver 49.2% 51.1% 49.1% 54.3% 52.5%
(50.0%) (50.0%) (50.0%) (49.8%) (49.9%)
Accident 2.6% 1.3% 1.5% 0.9% 1.3%
(15.8%) (11.3%) (12.1%) (9.7%) (11.5%)
Allston-Brighton 7.6% 6.8% 8.3% 4.6% 4.7%
(26.5%) (25.1%) (27.6%) (21.0%) (21.1%)
Boston Central 19.9% 13.1% 12.8% 12.2% 18.1%
(39.9%) (33.7%) (33.4%) (32.7%) (38.5%)
Charlestown-East Boston 10.1% 6.2% 8.4% 3.2% 3.2%
(30.2%) (24.1%) (27.8%) (17.5%) (17.5%)
Dorchester-Mattapan 21.4% 19.9% 20.3% 20.1% 16.4%
(41.0%) (39.9%) (40.2%) (40.1%) (37.0%)
Hyde Park 0.7% 0.9% 0.7% 1.3% 0.5%
(8.4%) (9.3%) (8.3%) (11.4%) (6.7%)
Jamaica Plain 2.3% 2.5% 3.1% 0.4% 6.1%
(14.9%) (15.6%) (17.3%) (6.2%) (23.9%)
Roslindale 0.5% 1.1% 1.3% 1.1% 0.7%
(7.2%) (10.6%) (11.2%) (10.2%) (8.2%)
Roxbury 13.3% 17.5% 18.5% 15.2% 19.7%
(33.9%) (38.0%) (38.9%) (35.9%) (39.8%)
South Boston 6.0% 4.0% 4.6% 3.5% 1.8%
(23.7%) (19.6%) (21.0%) (18.4%) (13.2%)
Number of Officers 946 684 469 163 52
Number of Citations 27,505 72,903 42,125 23,964 6,814
Primary Sample
33Table 4: Probability of Search and Guilt Conditional on Search
Oﬃcer Race Excluded
  Unweighted Probits  Weighted Probits 
  Search  Guilt  Search  Guilt 
Black Driver  0.003***  -0.001  0.019**  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.010)  (0.002) 
Hispanic Driver  0.003  -0.000  0.015  0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.005) 
Stop at Night  0.002  0.000  0.013  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.001) 
Young Driver (Age<26)  0.001**  -0.000  0.006  -0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.001) 
Male Driver  0.001  -0.000  0.006  -0.005 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
In-State Driver  0.001    0.010   
  (0.001)    (0.007)   
In-Town Driver  0.000  -0.000  0.003  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.001) 
Accident  0.037**  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.015)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.001) 
Neighborhood Control  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  70614  363  70614  363 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
If the search outcomes for an officer are missing in all cases except those in which the officer 
indicates that a search was conducted, then we code the missing search outcomes as “no search” 
(this affects 33 citations).  After this correction, officers with missing values for more than 10% of 
search outcomes are dropped.   Missing search outcomes for the remaining officers are dropped.    
     
Table 5: Probability of Search and Guilt Conditional on Search
Oﬃcer Race Excluded, Blacks and Whites Only
 
  Unweighted Probits  Weighted Probits 
  Search  Guilt  Search  Guilt 
Black Driver  0.003**  -0.014  0.018*  -0.013 
  (0.001)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Stop at Night  0.002  0.003  0.012  0.010 
  (0.002)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Young Driver (Age<26)  0.001  -0.011  0.005  -0.015* 
  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Male Driver  0.001  -0.014  0.003  -0.031 
  (0.001)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.023) 
In-State Driver  -0.000    0.007   
  (0.001)    (0.009)   
In-Town Driver  0.001*  -0.001  0.006  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
Accident  0.043**  -0.002  0.002  -0.005* 
  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.003) 
Neighborhood Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  55824  329  55824  329 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
If the search outcomes for an officer are missing in all cases except those in which the officer 
indicates that a search was conducted, then we code the missing search outcomes as “no search” 
(this affects 33 citations).  After this correction, officers with missing values for more than 10% of 
search outcomes are dropped.   Missing search outcomes for the remaining officers are dropped.    
     
34Table 6: Probability of Search, Baseline Speciﬁcation
  Unweighted Probits  Weighted Probits 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Black Driver  0.004***  0.003**  0.003**  0.008  0.003  0.006 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Hispanic Driver  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.004  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Black Officer  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.007  -0.009  -0.007 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Hispanic Officer  -0.004*  -0.003*  -0.003  -0.019**  -0.018**  -0.016** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Mismatch  0.002**  0.002*  0.002**  0.019**  0.023***  0.020*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Stop at Night    0.002  0.002    0.014  0.013 
    (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.009)  (0.008) 
Young Driver (Age<26)    0.002**  0.002**    0.006  0.006 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.008)  (0.007) 
Male Driver    0.001  0.001    0.006  0.005 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.006)  (0.006) 
In-State Driver    0.002  0.001    0.011  0.010 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.007)  (0.007) 
In-Town Driver    0.000  0.000    -0.000  0.002 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.006)  (0.006) 
Accident    0.039***  0.037**    0.000  -0.001 
    (0.014)  (0.015)    (0.011)  (0.011) 
Neighborhood Controls  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  72903  70614  70614  72903  70614  70614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
Table 7: Probability of Search, Baseline Speciﬁcation
Blacks and Whites Only    
 
  Unweighted Probits  Weighted Probits 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Black Driver  0.004**  0.003*  0.002**  0.011  0.004  0.004 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Black Officer  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.008  -0.012  -0.011* 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Mismatch  0.002*  0.002*  0.002*  0.017*  0.022***  0.021*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Stop at Night    0.002  0.002    0.012  0.012 
    (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.009)  (0.009) 
Young Driver (Age<26)    0.001  0.001    0.004  0.004 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.009)  (0.008) 
Male Driver    0.001  0.001    0.002  0.001 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.007)  (0.007) 
In-State Driver    0.000  -0.000    0.006  0.007 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.009)  (0.008) 
In-Town Driver    0.001*  0.001*    0.005  0.006 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.007)  (0.007) 
Accident    0.043**  0.043**    0.003  0.002 
    (0.018)  (0.019)    (0.014)  (0.013) 
Neighborhood Controls  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  57621  55824  55824  57621  55824  55824 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
35Table 8: Probability of Search, Robustness Checks
 Weighted  Probits 
  Search 1  Search 2  Search 3 
Black Driver  0.011*  0.008  0.011* 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Hispanic  Driver  0.003 0.002 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Black  Officer  -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Hispanic Officer  -0.010  -0.009*  -0.010 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Mismatch  0.014***  0.011***  0.014*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Stop at Night  0.014**  0.010**  0.014** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Young  Driver  (Age<26)  0.008 0.006 0.008 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Male  Driver  0.010** 0.007** 0.010** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
In-State  Driver  0.007 0.006 0.008 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
In-Town  Driver  0.004 0.001 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Accident 0.001  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Neighborhood  Controls  YES YES YES 
Observations  79,337 95,855 79,369 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
Table 9: Probability of Search, Robustness Checks
Blacks and Whites Only
 Weighted  Probits 
  Search 1  Search 2  Search 3 
Black  Driver  0.010 0.007 0.009 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Black  Officer  -0.010* -0.007* -0.010* 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Mismatch  0.014**  0.011**  0.014** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Stop at Night  0.011*  0.008  0.011* 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Young  Driver  (Age<26)  0.006 0.004 0.006 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Male  Driver  0.007 0.005 0.007 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
In-State  Driver  0.003 0.002 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
In-Town  Driver  0.005 0.002 0.005 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Accident  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) 
Neighborhood  Controls  YES YES YES 
Observations  62,539 74,837 62,560 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
36Table 10: Probability of Search, Patrol Oﬃcers
 Weighted  Probits 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Black Driver  -0.005  -0.002  0.003 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Hispanic  Driver  0.001 0.003 0.001 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
Black  Officer  -0.012 -0.009 -0.007 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Hispanic Officer  -0.018**  -0.015*  -0.013* 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Mismatch  0.016**  0.016**  0.013** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Stop at Night    0.009  0.007 
   (0.009)  (0.007) 
Young Driver (Age<26)    -0.004  -0.003 
   (0.007)  (0.006) 
Male Driver    0.008  0.007 
   (0.006)  (0.005) 
In-State Driver    0.008  0.007 
   (0.008)  (0.007) 
In-Town Driver    -0.002  -0.000 
   (0.006)  (0.006) 
Accident   0.018  0.017 
   (0.018)  (0.018) 
Neighborhood Controls  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  71,560 69,346 69,346 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
 
Table 11: Probability of Search, Patrol Oﬃcers
Blacks and Whites Only
 Weighted  Probits 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Black  Driver  -0.001 0.001 0.005 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Black  Officer  -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Mismatch  0.014  0.013*  0.013* 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
Stop at Night    0.009  0.008 
   (0.010)  (0.009) 
Young Driver (Age<26)    -0.010*  -0.009 
   (0.006)  (0.006) 
Male Driver    0.004  0.004 
   (0.007)  (0.006) 
In-State Driver    0.002  0.003 
   (0.009)  (0.008) 
In-Town Driver    0.000  0.000 
   (0.007)  (0.008) 
Accident   0.028  0.028 
   (0.024)  (0.023) 
Neighborhood Controls  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  56,409 54,684 54,684 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
37Table 12: Probability of Search, April-May 2001
 Weighted  Probits 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Black Driver  -0.016  -0.014  -0.015* 
 (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
Hispanic Driver  0.017  0.011  -0.003 
 (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.014) 
Black Officer  0.005  0.003  0.009 
 (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Hispanic Officer  -0.004  0.004  -0.003 
 (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.016) 
Mismatch  0.030*  0.028*  0.030** 
 (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.013) 
Stop at Night    0.030  0.031* 
   (0.021)  (0.017) 
Young Driver (Age<26)    -0.009  -0.012* 
   (0.010)  (0.007) 
Male Driver    0.022**  0.017** 
   (0.011)  (0.008) 
In-State Driver    0.012  0.008 
   (0.011)  (0.010) 
In-Town Driver    -0.004  -0.001 
   (0.010)  (0.008) 
Accident   0.010  0.010 
   (0.023)  (0.024) 
Neighborhood Controls  NO  NO  YES 
Observations 16,162  15,407  13,683 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
Table 13: Probability of Search, Unexperienced vs. Experienced Oﬃcers
Weighted Probits
  Inexperienced Officers (<=10 years)  Experienced Officers (>10 years) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Black Driver  -0.008  -0.004  -0.002  0.024  0.007  0.014 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Hispanic Driver  0.002  0.004  0.004  0.009  -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.010) 
Black Officer  -0.004  -0.001  -0.003  -0.006  -0.014*  -0.008 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Hispanic Officer  -0.026***  -0.020***  -0.018***  -0.004  -0.005  -0.003 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
Mismatch  0.008  0.010  0.008  0.026*  0.032**  0.024** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.010) 
Stop at Night    0.025**  0.022**    0.002  0.000 
    (0.011)  (0.009)    (0.009)  (0.007) 
Young Driver (Age<26)    -0.011**  -0.009*    0.024*  0.021* 
    (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.013)  (0.011) 
Male Driver    -0.000  0.000    0.009  0.008 
    (0.006)  (0.005)    (0.008)  (0.006) 
In-State Driver    0.015***  0.013***    -0.004  -0.003 
    (0.005)  (0.004)    (0.015)  (0.013) 
In-Town Driver    -0.012**  -0.011*    0.013  0.013* 
    (0.006)  (0.006)    (0.008)  (0.007) 
Accident    0.005  0.004    0.003  0.004 
    (0.009)  (0.007)    (0.016)  (0.015) 
Neighborhood Controls  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  34073  33232  33232  38830  37382  37073 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
38Table 14: Racial Composition of Police Districts
District White Black Hispanic Asian White Black Hispanic Asian
A-1 76.7% 3.3% 3.2% 15.1% 62.8% 24.8% 8.0% 4.4%
A-7 53.0% 2.4% 36.6% 3.7% 72.1% 16.4% 9.8% 1.6%
B-2 22.1% 47.8% 17.0% 4.7% 51.7% 35.7% 10.9% 1.7%
B-3 3.8% 78.9% 10.8% 1.1% 55.2% 37.3% 6.6% 0.9%
C-6 87.5% 1.8% 5.2% 4.0% 76.5% 14.8% 7.4% 1.3%
C-11 41.4% 28.7% 9.0% 12.5% 70.4% 17.3% 8.7% 3.6%
D-4 66.7% 9.9% 8.8% 11.5% 69.8% 21.2% 7.3% 1.7%
D-14 71.3% 3.9% 8.0% 13.1% 71.1% 16.3% 9.6% 3.0%
E-5 80.7% 6.2% 7.8% 3.0% 71.1% 22.2% 5.9% 0.7%
E-13 54.3% 15.2% 25.0% 2.3% 60.5% 21.6% 17.2% 0.8%
E-18 47.9% 33.7% 11.9% 3.0% 59.1% 30.7% 10.2% 0.0%
Source:  The Census numbers are taken from the "Massachusetts Racial and Gender Profiling Project: 
Preliminary Tabulations," prepared by Northeastern University, Institute on Race and Justice.  The citation-
level numbers were derived from our data.
Population 18 and Older
Census Benchmark
Racial Breakdown of Officers by District
Citation-Level Data
Table 15: Probability of Search, Drivers Stopped in Their Own Neighborhood
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
6/25/2004 5:17 PM table15 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Black  Driver  0.010 0.002 0.005 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
Hispanic  Driver  -0.003 -0.009 -0.010 
  (0.015) (0.011) (0.008) 
Black  Officer  -0.002 -0.009 -0.006 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
Hispanic  Officer  -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.023*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Mismatch  0.025**  0.029***  0.024*** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
Stop at Night    0.003  0.004 
   (0.009)  (0.008) 
Young Driver (Age<26)    0.015  0.013 
   (0.012)  (0.010) 
Male Driver    -0.001  -0.001 
   (0.009)  (0.007) 
Accident   -0.004  -0.004 
   (0.012)  (0.010) 
Neighborhood Controls  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  37047 36075 36075 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
39Table 16: Probability of Search, Drivers Stopped in Their Own Neighborhood
Blacks and Whites Only
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
6/25/2004 5:18 PM table16 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Black  Driver  0.011 0.002 0.001 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Black  Officer  0.003 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) 
Mismatch  0.032**  0.036***  0.031*** 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) 
Stop at Night    0.007  0.007 
   (0.012)  (0.010) 
Young Driver (Age<26)    0.018  0.018 
   (0.014)  (0.012) 
Male Driver    -0.007  -0.005 
   (0.011)  (0.009) 
Accident   -0.004  -0.003 
   (0.016)  (0.013) 
Neighborhood Controls  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  27524 26803 26803 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
Table 17: Probability of Search, Diverse vs. Homogeneous Neighborhoods
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
6/28/2004 1:47 PM table17 
 
  Diverse Neighborhoods  Homogeneous Neighborhoods 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Black  Driver  -0.029*  -0.032**  -0.027*  0.014 0.017 0.015 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Hispanic  Driver  -0.001 -0.004 -0.003  -0.002  0.002  0.003 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Black  Officer  -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.022**  0.006  0.008  0.009 
  (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Hispanic  Officer  -0.014 -0.016 -0.012  -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.016*** 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Mismatch  0.028*  0.027*  0.023*  0.016*  0.017**  0.015** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Stop at Night    0.021  0.021    0.006  0.004 
   (0.016)  (0.015)   (0.009)  (0.008) 
Young Driver (Age<26)    0.003  0.002    -0.004  -0.003 
   (0.013)  (0.012)   (0.008)  (0.007) 
Male Driver    0.020**  0.019**    -0.010  -0.010 
   (0.010)  (0.009)   (0.008)  (0.008) 
In-State  Driver   0.009  0.005   0.010  0.010* 
   (0.017)  (0.019)   (0.007)  (0.006) 
In-Town  Driver    0.005 0.007   -0.002 0.000 
   (0.010)  (0.010)   (0.007)  (0.007) 
Accident   -0.008  -0.010    0.022  0.023 
   (0.012)  (0.010)   (0.027)  (0.027) 
Neighborhood  Controls  NO NO  YES  NO NO  YES 
Observations  19758 19229  19229  38655 37234 37234 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The neighborhoods categorized as diverse are East Boston (including Charlestown), Roxbury/Mission Hill, Jamaica Plain and Hyde Park.  
The neighborhoods characterized as homogeneous are Boston Central, South Boston, Allston/Brighton and West Roxbury/Roslindale. 
       
40Table 18: Probability of Search, Diverse vs. Homogeneous Neighborhoods
Blacks and Whites Only
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
6/28/2004 1:49 PM table18 
 
  Diverse Neighborhoods  Homogeneous Neighborhoods 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Black  Driver  -0.014 -0.016 -0.018  0.013  0.012  0.012 
  (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
Black  Officer  -0.023**  -0.018*  -0.019**  -0.002 0.000 0.001 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Mismatch  0.012  0.010  0.009  0.021*  0.022*  0.020** 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) 
Stop at Night    0.029  0.027    -0.000  -0.001 
   (0.021)  (0.019)   (0.009)  (0.008) 
Young  Driver  (Age<26)   -0.005  -0.005   -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.013)  (0.013)   (0.009)  (0.008) 
Male Driver    0.014  0.012    -0.013  -0.014 
   (0.011)  (0.009)   (0.010)  (0.009) 
In-State  Driver   0.005  0.006   0.007  0.008 
   (0.020)  (0.020)   (0.008)  (0.007) 
In-Town  Driver   0.003  0.003   0.005  0.007 
   (0.011)  (0.012)   (0.008)  (0.008) 
Accident   -0.000  -0.002    0.021  0.022 
   (0.014)  (0.013)   (0.029)  (0.028) 
Neighborhood  Controls  NO NO  YES NO NO  YES 
Observations  14899 14506 14506 30903 29776 29776 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The neighborhoods categorized as diverse are East Boston (including Charlestown), Roxbury/Mission Hill, Jamaica Plain and 
Hyde Park.  The neighborhoods characterized as homogeneous are Boston Central, South Boston, Allston/Brighton and West 
Roxbury/Roslindale.        
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